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In April 1991 the Iowa Department of Transportation, the CNW Transportation Company, 
the SOO Line, and local agencies and business in the Mason City/Oear Lake area initiated an 
Operation Lifesaver program to attempt to increase public awareness of safety issues and safe 
behavior at railroad-highway grade crossings. This document reports an initial study of data on 
traffic characteristics at a selected set of grade crossings in Cerro Gordo County taken before and 
after the safety program. Twenty-two crossings were studied. The 13 crossings at which 
collisions were reported for the five years prior to the study were included in the sample of sites. 
Two field observations were made at each study crossing before the Operation Lifesaver campaign 
was in full swing, and two observations were made after the conclusion of the main effort of the 
campaign. The summary of each data set is contained in the companion volume entitled, "Drivers' 
Behavioral Railroad Grade Crossings: Before and After Safety Campaign, Survey Data 
Summaries." 
A radar speed gun was used to record the speed of vehicles approaching the crossing and as 
they crossed the tracks. Observers also noted whether drivers looked for trains or gave other 
evidence of checking to be sure the crossing was clear of trains before proceeding across the tracks. 
Observers recorded the frequency with which drivers braked and were prepared to stop as they 
approached the tracks. 
Analysis of these data revealed that at crossings in 25 mph speed zone areas, drivers 
reduced their average overall speed significantly after Operation Lifesaver. In areas with increasing 
speed limits (and generally much lower roadway traffic volumes), reductions in average speeds 
were seen but the change was not consistently significant statistically. 
When the vehicle speed data were broken out by crossings where accidents had occurred 
versus those with no accident history, the approach and crossing speeds recorded at the accident 
crossings generally were lower after Operation Lifesaver. The data on drivers' attention were also 
examined with respect to accident and nonaccident sites. On average, drivers were more attentive in 
looking for a crossing hazard at the accident sites after Operation Lifesaver, the reverse was true for 
the nonaccident sites. Although there were differences in the rate of observed application of brakes 
at both accident and nonaccident sites after Operation Lifesaver, nothing was statistically 
significant. Thus braking differences were not reliable indicators of the effectiveness of the safety 
campaign: 
The research shows that Operation Lifesaver, as conducted in Mason City and Cerro Gordo 
County in April 1991, altered drivers' behavior in the following ways: (!)reduced approach 
speeds and crossing speeds at crossings with low speed limits, (2) reduced the percent of drivers 
approaching the crossing at speeds in excess of the posted speed limit, and (3) increased alettness 
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of drivers to railroad crossing hazards as evidenced by more drivers looking for a clear track. 
Thus, Operation Lifesaver enhanced safety in street and highway traffic operations in the vicinity of 
railroad-highway grade crossings. 
INTRODUCTION 
General Situation 
Collisions at railroad-highway grade crossings have long been a safety concern. Fifty 
years ago automotive collisions at railroad crossings were a major portion of all highway accidents. 
Since then several factors have combined to significantly reduce the frequency of these collisions. 
Railroad mileage has been reduced. Many. high-volume streets and highways have been grade-
separated at railroads. Improved signs, flashing train-activated signals, and train-activated 
crossings gates have been installed in increasing numbers every year. Maintenance and 
reconstruction projects undertaken jointly by railroads and highway agencies have improved 
drivers' sight distance at railroad-highway grade crossings. However, even with these 
improvements, a significant safety concern continues to exist because collisions at these crossings 
frequently produce tragic injuries, often resulting in fatalities. Since engineering improvements at 
many crossings have been developed as far as can be justified economically, increased emphasis is 
now needed on improving drivers' awareness of railroad-highway crossings and enhancing their 
response to the existing traffic controls. 
Previous Research 
Much research has been done to assess motorists' understanding of traffic control at 
railroad-highway grade crossings (for example, Richards and Heathington). Also, the various and 
sundry devices used at railroad-highway crossings to control automotive traffic and to warn drivers 
have been studied (for example, Fambro, Heathington, and Richards). Furthermore, much has 
been done to try to create formulas and equations to predict whether a crossing will be safe or not, 
to predict the relative hazard of a crossing, and to predict the probability of a collision (for example, 
Faghri and Demetsky). Collisions at railroad-highway grade crossings happen very infrequently 
and are almost random in the rate of occurrence. This makes it very difficult to estimate the average 
number of collisions at some specific crossing for any given time period, say five years. In 
addition, any estimate of collisions has a large probable error; that is, the estimate will not be very 
accurate. However, traffic engineers have known for a long time that intersections with low 
accident rates but high levels of traffic flow conflicts are good candidates for safety improvements. 
Changing a street or highway intersection to reduce traffic conflicts will reduce future accidents. In 
2 
the same way it is important to see if railroad crossing safety campaigns cause more safe driver 
behavior and reduce the potential for future collisions at railroad crossing in the campaign area. 
General Problem 
The Iowa Department of Transportation has been working with the Federal Highway 
Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration, operating railroad companies, and local 
highway agencies for many years to improve safety at railroad-highway grade crossings in the 
state. This program includes improving sight distance at crossings, increasing the quality and 
quantity of signs and markings, increasing the number of signals and gates installed, installing train 
motion sensors, and improving train signal detection systems. The Iowa Department of 
Transportation, Iowa cities, Iowa counties, and operating railroad companies have also recognized 
the need to improve drivers' behavior and their awareness of the proper motorist response at 
railroad-highway grade crossings and have instituted numerous cooperative "Operation Lifesaver" 
programs. 
Study Objective 
The objective of the current research is to document drivers' behavior in the vicinity of a set 
of grade crossh-igs before aitd after a..1 Operation Lifesaver cruupaibu ai1d to evaluate tii.e ai11ow1t ai1d 
significance of any change in drivers' behavior. 
Conduct of Study 
An Operation Lifesaver campaign was scheduled for April 1991 in the Mason City, Iowa 
area This area was small enough to be manageable and yet had significant railroad mileage and a 
history of crossing accidents. Thus an evaluation study was considered to be feasible without 
incurring major research expenses. The study was designed to sample crossings across Cerro 
Gordo County (Mason City is the largest city and county seat) so that some crossings would be 
observed far enough away from Mason City to minimize the impact of the safety campaign. The 
original study design suggested that the crossings studied should have one of three levels of 
protection: 
(1) Gates 
(2) Flashing signals 
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(3) Crossbucks and advance warning signs only 
The original study was designed to include enough crossings to also factor the data by the 
following site conditions: 
(1) Street or highway traffic volume crossing the tracks 
(2) Land use development environment 
(a) Urban or town 
(b) Rural 
(3) Railroad environment 
(a) Single or multiple tracks 
(b) Through traffic or switching operations 
( c) Train frequency and speed 
(d) Train visibility from highway on approach to crossing 
All Cerro Gordo County crossings for which a collision had been recorded in the past five years 
were included. In addition, at least two study crossings in each cell of a matrix for all study factors 
were considered desirable. A preliminary estimate of the number of crossings that could be 
observed and studied in the time available "before" and "after" the safety campaign suggested that 
24 to 30 crossings were the limit. Thirteen crossings in Cerro Gordo County had recorded 
collisions in the five years prior to the study. Table 1 lists these crossings with selected classifying 
infmmation about each one. After an on-site reconnaissance of the potential sites, additional 
crossings were added to those listed in Table 1 to achieve a balance among the factors listed above 
and yet hold the total survey sites to 24 or less. After conducting a pilot data collection test , the 
researchers estimated that 24 sites were the maximum number of sites that could be observed both 
before and after the safety campaign within the time limits of the project . The crossings without a 
five-year history of accidents that were added to the study are listed in Table 2. Note that one 
crossing was lost due to street construction and a second was deleted to retain study balance leaving 
a total of 22 crossings that were surveyed in this project. The location of the final set of study 
crossings are shown in Figures 1-4. 
Prior to the study, researchers decided that the measures of drivers' behavior that might be 
affected by a safety campaign and might also be related to reducing the potential for collisions at the 
crossings included: 
(I) Speed of vehicles approaching the crossing 
(2) Speed of vehicles crossing the tracks 
(3) Drivers looking for signs, signals, and trains 
(4) Obeying or disobeying any signals flashing, gates down, or train warnings 
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Fig. I. Cerro Gordo County railroad-highway grade crossing sites. 
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Table 1. Railroad crossings in Cerro Gordo County with accidents in the 5 years prior to study. 
Location Xing Daily Trlcs Yeh./ Acci- Site 
Protection Trains Day dents No. 
Clear Lake, 13th St. N X-bucks 1 1 436 1 1 
Clear Lake 8th St. N Gates 1 1 4970 1 2 
Clear Lake, 2nd Pl. N Signals 1 2 2780 2 3 
Mason City, 12th St. NW Signals 5 4 5584 5 10 
Mason City, 1st St. NW Gates 5 1 4550 1 9 
Mason City, 6th St. SW Signals 5 1 5990 2 ' 8 
Mason City, 19th St. SW (west) Signals 5 1 6740. 2 7 
Mason City, 19th St. SW (east) Signals 0 1 6670 1 6 
Mason City, S. Carolina Ave. Signals 8 6 1920 2 4 
Mason City, 8th St. SE X-bucks 0 1 1358 1 5 
Cerro Gordo Co., Sec. 20-94-20 X-bucks 6 1 50 1 19 
Cerro Gordo Co., Sec. 12-95-21 X-bucks 1 1 640 1 11 
Cerro Gordo Co., Sec. 21-97-20 X-bucks 5 1 55 1 13 
These measures were collected in the before condition during February and March 1991. Each site 
was observed twice to collect two data samples. Several of Ille rural sites outside Mason City were 
observed during the first part of April. Data was collected after the Operation Lifesaver campaign in 
the latter half of May and in June 1991. 
Speed data for the vehicles approaching the crossing and for vehicles crossing the tracks 
were measured with a radar speed gun. Data collection personnel parked in a driveway, parking 
lot, field entrance, or other location near the crossing where a vehicle might be expected to be sitting 
in a nmmal operating environment. When any advertising sign, shrub line, or other screening was 
available, these features were used to hide the obse1Vation crew as much as possible because it is 
important to avoid being obvious in observing the traffic flow. Some drivers will alter their 
behavior if they suspect police enforcement may be associated with the data collection. Other 
drivers will alter their behavior due to curiosity in what is commonly called the "gawker effect" if 
data collection personnel are too obvious in their presence. As much as possible, approach speeds 
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T bl 2 "d dd d d fl bal a e . Nonacc1 ent crossmgs a e to stu ty or d ance an coverage. 
Location Xing Daily Trks Veh./ Acci-
Protection Trains Day dents 
Rockwell, Elm St.* Gates 0 4 219 0 
Rockwell, Madison St. (Hwy B60) Signals 0 l 1044 0 
Meservey, 1st St. (Iowa 107) Signals 1 3 1060 0 
Mason City, 9th St. NW Gates 5 2 1320 0 
Mason City, 15th St. SW Signals 12 1 2971 0 
Mason City, Carolina Place SE** X-bucks 8 I 580 0 
Ventura, Main St. (Hwy S 14) Gates 1 2 1640 0 
Cerro Gordo Co., Sec. 8-94-20 Gates 6 1 770 0 
Cerro Gordo Co., Sec. 8-95-20 Signals 6 l 640 0 
Cerro Gordo Co., Sec. 9-97-20 Signals 5 l 440 0 
Cerro Gordo Co., Sec. 17-96-19 Shmals 4 2 800 0 
*Deleted after Carolina Place was lost; no accidents; gates already sufficient; low volume. 
**Lost due to construction which began after project was initiated. 














were matched with crossing speeds on the same driver/vehicle. This matching of speeds in the 
approach and crossing could be done most of the time until a roadway had average annual daily 
traffic (AADT) levels of about 2,000 vehicles per day. Once the AADT reaches about 6,000 
vehicles per day it was found to be nearly impossible to match approach speeds with crossing 
speeds. 
One member of the observer team was assigned to watch the drivers to note whether the 
driver indicated any caution at the crossing by looking up and down the track before crossing. This 
observer relJlained in the observation vehicle with the person recording speeds. Therefore, the 
observer team was forced to watch the driver through rear and side windows of the vehicle crossing 
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the tracks. For trucks, sport hatchback automobiles, and cars with black tint windows, observers 
found it difficult to always note the driver's behavior. 
When a train approached the tracks, a gate was down, or a flashing signal was activated, all 
vehicles approaching the crossing were observed fof correct behavior. Vehicles trying to "beat" a 
train to the crossing, driving around lowered gates, and not stopping before crossing when a signal 
was flashing were noted. Since train traffic is almost always sparse, traffic was not often observed 
having the opportunity to show their willingness to obey or disobey protection devices. 
Mason City Operation Lifesaver Content 
A wide range of activities were conducted in the Operation Lifesaver campaign in Mason 
City. The original Operation Lifesaver plan was for all the activities to take place in April. 
However, some activities that require public service cooperation of the media cannot be strictly 
controlled. As a result, one of the billboard safety messages along U.S. 18 near the Mason City 
Municipal Airport was erected in March because of other billboard space commitments, and some 
of the billboard displays along U. S. 18 in Clear Lake and near Ventura were erected in May and 
June. The range of safety campaign activities follows: 
1. An accident investigation course was conducted for law enforcement officials. 
2. A three-day open house was held at the Soo Line railway depot in Mason City. 
3. Presentations were made in schools with special emphasis on high schools and driver 
education classes. 
4. Posters were provided to business and industries to place on company bulletin boards 
and check stuffers on railroad crossing safety were provided to organizations that were 
willing to insert them in payroll check envelopes. 
5. An increase in general public awareness was attempted through the public media and 
publicity: 
A. Billboards: Billboards were put up in the Mason City area at the rate of two per 
month (on average) from March 1991 on. Each billboard had a safety message and 
a different tag line at the bottom that could be used for any location or any time of 
year. 
B. Newspaper articles: Two articles were printed in the Mason City newspaper. 
C. Video billboards: Messages were broadcast for a month with the assistance of 
the local cable television channel community bulletin board. 
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D. Mayoral proclamation: The Mayor of Mason City was involved in proclaiming 
April 1991 as Operation Lifesaver month. His messages were broadcast on 
television. 
E. Information booths at public malls: Booths were set up at the local 
shopping mall for one weekend to distribute public information. A $100 gift 
certificate give-away was used to attract people to the booth 
F. Safety messages at some businesses with high public contact: Safety 
messages were put on McDonald's restaurant tray food liners for two months. 
Hy-Vee grocery store put fliers with an Operation Lifesaver safety message into 
each grocery bag during the campaign. 
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ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
In analyzing and interpreting the data collected, the researcher used the student's t-test, a 
commonly accepted and frequently used statistical method to evaluate the significance of any 
difference in the mean value between two samples from similar data. It is a standard traffic 
engineering practice to use this method to evaluate the change in vehicle speeds from one traffic 
condition to another. Any reader desiring to learn more about it is encouraged to consult Statistics 
Manual by Crow, Davis, and Maxfield. This is a clearly and concisely written paperback book of 
modest cost. Chapter 2 thoroughly explains the principles used in this research. The computational 
form used in this research comes from Sections 7.9 and 7.10 of Statistics in Research by Ostle. 
A "two-tailed" test is used because the average speed after the safety campaign could be 
either larger or smaller than the average speed before Operation Lifesaver. Generally accepted 
probability levels for determining the significance of differences between means are 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01. Any probability level greater than 0.10 usually indicates low reliability in any observed 
differences since random variation in the data implies that the difference in means could likely be 
due to chance variation rather than the experimental treatment. 
Overall Grouped Speed Samples 
Approach Speeds in 25 mph Zones 
The data for all sites having an approach speed of 25 miles per hour were grouped together 
to test for any speed change from the before campaign data to the after campaign data. These data 
include sites 1-5, 8-10, 15, 17, and 18. The average speed before on 2809 vehicles was 25.54 
mph. The average speed after was 23.19 mph on 2421 vehicles. The student's t-test value to test 
the significance of the 2.35 mph difference was 1.83, which is significant for a two-tailed test at the 
0.10 level. This suggests that the reduced average speed shows a small but significant overall 
change from before to after the safety campaign. 
Crossing Speeds in 25 mph Zones 
Data sites 1-5, 8-10, 15, 17, and 18 (25 mph approach speed limit) were grouped together 
for analyzing crossing speed behavior before and after the safety campaign. The average crossing 
speed before the campaign on 3949 vehicles was 19.10 mph. The average crossing speed after it 
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on 3183 vehicles was 16.87 mph. The student's t-test value to test the significance of the 2.23 mph 
reduction in average crossing speed was 2.05, which is significant at the 0.05 level. This suggests 
that the reduced speed is a small but significant change from before the safety campaign to after the 
safety campaign. 
Approach Speeds in SS mph Zones 
Sites with 55 mph approach speed limits included 11, 13, and 19-23. These are all fairly 
low-volume routes to very low-volume routes. The average speed before the campaign was 47.26 
mph for 397 vehicles approaching the crossings. The average speed after it was 45.77 mph for 378 
vehicles. The student's t-test value to test the significance of the 1.49 mph difference was 0.23 
which is totally insignificant. Thus, while the average speed of vehicles approaching the crossings 
having a 55 mph approach speed limit did go down after the safety campaign, the reduction in 
speed could have very easily been due to chance variation or factors not associated with Operation 
Lifesaver. 
Crossing Speeds in SS mph Zones 
Sites with 55 mph crossing speeds were also numbers 11, 13 and 19-23. The average 
speed before the safety campaign for vehicles crossing the tracks was 43.39 mph for 463 vehicles 
and the average speed after it was 39.98 mph for 450 vehicles. The student's t-test value to test the 
significance of the 3.41 mph difference was 0.37, which is also totally insignificant. Again, even 
though the average speed of vehicles crossing the tracks was reduced 3.41 mph, that difference 
could easily have been due to chance or factors other than the safety campaign. 
Approach Speeds in 35 mph Zones 
Only two sites, 14 and 16, had 35 mph speed limits on the approach to the crossings. The 
average approach speed was 32.52 mph on 484 vehicles before the safety campaign and 30.44 mph 
on 175 vehicles after it. This 2.08 mph reduction in approach speeds had a student's t-test value of 
0.28, which is also totally insignificant. Thus, it is more likely that this approach speed reduction 
after the safety campaign was due to random chance than the campaign. 
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Crossing Speeds in 35 mph Zones 
The average crossing speed before the campaign was 28.83 mph on 570 vehicles and was 
27.44 mph on 317 vehicles after the safety campaign. This 1.39 mph reduction in crossing speeds 
had a student's t-test value of 0.30, which is once again totally insignificant. Thus, changes in 
speeds crossing the tracks in 35 mph speed zone sites cannot be said to be caused by the safety 
campaign. 
Approach Speeds in 30 mph Zone 
Only site 6 had an approach speed limit of 30 mph. The average approach speed before 
was 33.34 mph on 482 vehicles and the average approach speed after was 32.04 mph. The 1.30 
mph reduction in average speed in approach speeds had a student's t-test of 0.33, which is totally 
. 
insignificant. Therefore, the difference in average approach speeds can not be seen as significant. 
Crossing Speeds in 30 mph Zone 
Site 6 had an average speed of 32.37 mph for 528 vehicles crossing the tracks before and 
31.69 mph for 452 vehicles crossing after. This 0.68 mph reduction in average speed crossing the 
tracks from before to after the safety campaign had a student's t-test value of 0.17, which is totally 
insignificant. Thus, the difference in average crossing speeds from before to after is more likely 
due to random chance than to the safety campaign. 
Approach Speeds. in 45 mph Zone 
Only site 7 had approach speed limits of 45 mph. An average approach speed of 39.44 
mph was observed before the campaign condition on 403 vehicles and an average speed of 41.04 
mph on 424 vehicles was observed after the safety campaign. The 1.60 mph increase in the 
average speed had a student's t-test associated with it of0.29. This is totally insignificant. The 
increase in speed from before to after is likely to be a random chance rather than anything done in 
Operation Lifesaver. 
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Crossing Speeds in 45 mph Zone 
Site 7 had average crossing speeds of 38.62 mph before the campaign on 556 vehicles and 
37.53 mph on 427 vehicles after it. These data gave a student's t-test of0.25, which is totally 
insignificant. Crossing speeds did decline an average of 1.09 mph from before to after the safety 
campaign, but most likely this is random chance and not the effect of the safety campaign. 
Conclusions for Sites Grouped by Speed Limit on Approach 
When the data are grouped by the speed limit on the approach to the crossing, only those 
crossings with a 25 mph speed limit have significant speed differences from before the campaign to 
after it. All of the other speed groups except the average approach speed changes at site 7 (45 mph 
speed limit) produced a reduced average speed from before to after, but it was not statistically 
significant. Thus, the data indicate that the urban sites with low speed limits and higher traffic 
volumes can be affected by Operation Lifesaver, and this effect should lead to potentially safer 
railroad-highway grade crossings. 
Percent of Vehicles Above the Speed Limit 
During t..lte early stages of data collection, drivers at some sites \vere obviously not obeying 
the speed limit. Most computations to detennine any flashing signal or gates protection design for a 
crossing will assume drivers are not exceeding the speed limit. Thus, the degree to which 
Operation Lifesaver affected driver behavior in obeying the speed limit in the vicinity of the railroad 
crossing was analyzed. 
Approach Speeds at Accident Sites 
The sites at which accidents had occurred in the previous five years were tabulated with the 
percent of all observed approach speeds that exceeded the posted speed limit. (See Table 3.) Each 
site result for before and after was then considered on an equal weight value. An average percent 
change before and after was calculated and a student's t-test was conducted to see if any change 
was significant. A computed t-test value of2.24 had a 0.0226 level of significance (a one-tailed 
test was used because the only concern was being above the speed limit). This result suggests that 
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Operation Lifesaver had an impact on drivers' behavior by reducing the percentage of drivers at the 
accident sites who exceed the approach speed limit. The "one-tailed" statistical test was necessary 
in estimating the probability of erroneous interpretation of any differences because we were only 
interested in the proportion of the drivers exceeding the speed limit. 
Approach Speeds at Nonaccident Sites 
The percent of drivers on the approach to the crossing who were exceeding the posted 
speed limit was tabulated for all the sites that had not experienced an accident in the previous five 
years. (See Table 4.) The average percent of drivers exceeding the speed limit was reduced more 
at nonaccident sites after the safety campaign than it was at accident sites. However, this larger 
difference yielded at-test value of 1.903, which had an associated proba.bility of0.0414 and is a 
little less significant statistically than for the accident sites. However the computed t-test value of 
1.983 had a little less significance at 0.0414 level. This is still quite significant and indicates 
Operation Lifesaver had an impact on drivers' behavior at the nonaccident sites as well as the sites 
with a history of accidents. 
Crossing Speeds at Accident Sites 
Since Operation Lifesaver was found to have an effect in reducing the percent of drivers 
exceeding the speed limit on the approach to the crossings having a history of accidents, it may be 
expected that since drivers were exercising more caution on the approach, they might not make as 
much adjustment in speed in crossing the tracks. The percent of vehicles exceeding the speed limit 
while crossing the tracks was tabulated for all crossings that had an accident in the previous five 
years. (Table 5 indicates an average reduction per site of 5.15 mph.) The computed t-test value for 
these data was 1.80 which provided a 0.0484 level of significance indicating a highly significant 
reduction due to Operation Lifesaver, just as had been found on the approach speeds. 
Crossing Speeds at Nonaccident Sites 
The percent of drivers who were observed to be exceeding the speed limit in crossing the 
tracks for the sites that had no accidents in the previous five years is tabulated in Table 6. These 
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Tab! 3 P f h e . ercent o annroac sn d di ctr · "'' s excee mr sne.e1 umt at acCI ent sites 
Site No. % Before CarnpaiITTl % After CarnpaiITTl 
I 14.29 8.33 
2 74.01 73.02 
3 39.02 22.86 
4 54.42 66.86 
5 40.87 32.56 
6 57.50 53.92 
7 27.72 27.78 
8 40.24 27.45 
9 32.23 22.44 
10 78.10 66.80 
11 6.56 3.23 
13 0 0 
19 0 0 
Avenu?e 35.76 31.76 
Table 4. Percent of annroach sneeds exceeding sneed limit at nonaccident sites. 
Site No. % Before CarnpaiITTl % After Campaign 
14 21.73 21.37 
15 16.06 6.06 
16 52.63 56.90 
17 50.67 52.43 
18 61.29 42.35 
20 21.88 11.69 
21 15.52 3.57 
22 0 0 
23 11.97 10.92 
Avern<>e 27.97 22.91 
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Table 5. Pen:ent of crossing sneeds exceeding sneed limit at accident sites. 
Site No. % Before Campai!m % After Campai!m 
1 0 0 
2 3.51 0 
3 1.35 0.74 
4 18.81 19.80 
5 17.19 7.05 
6 70.37 56.45 
7 14.41 14.09 
8 20.00 8.40 
9 19.67 27.80 
10 47.64 11.64 
11 3.23 0 
13 0 0 
19 0 0 
Avera<re 19.53 14.38 
T bl 6 a e f d d' . Percent o crossmg spee s excee mg speed lnmt at nonaccident sites. 
Site No. % Before Campai!m % After Campaign 
14 14.71 12.56 
15 5.49 2.34 
16 25.65 17.27 
17 10.71 4.69 
18 0.32 0 
20 14.79 3.28 
21 7.46 2.82 
22 2.33 2.38 
23 0 0.74 
Average 9.05 5.12 
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data produce at-test value of 2.85 with a significance level of 0.0094. This highly significant level 
indicates the effect of Operation Lifesaver on drivers' behavior at the nonaccident sites by reducing 
the overall rate at which drivers exceeded the speed limit in crossing the tracks. 
Drivers' Attention 
The percent of all drivers who could actually be observed looking for trains or in some 
other way checking the clearance of the tracks before crossing was tabulated for each crossing 
before and after the safety campaign. The data were separated by accident site versus nonaccident 
site to examine any effect on drivers' perception of potential hazards from their general awareness 
of past accident history. 
Drivers' Attention at Accident Sites 
Table 7 lists the percent of observed drivers looking and making an effort to be attentive in 
crossing at the sites that had accidents in the previous five years. These data produced at-test value 
with a 0.1058 level of significance, just barely over 0.10 that is usually taken to be the maximum 
value for reliably assigning significance to sample differences. Thus, a person should be hesitant to 
say the overall average increase in drivers' attention was strongly associated with Operation 
Lifesaver. Although at most of the crossings observers noted a good-sized increase in the percent 
of drivers looking for trains, several showed noticeable decreases, which reduces the statistical 
reliability of this measure. However, these results do not cancel out the obvious indication that 
there was an overall average increase in the number of drivers looking and exercising caution. 
Drivers' Attention at Nonaccident Sites 
Table 8 contains the percent of drivers observed to be looking and exercising caution while 
crossing the tracks at the sites that had no accidents in the previous five years. Note that the overall 
ayerage attentiveness decreased after the Operation Lifesaver campaign. This change in average rate 
oflooking produced at-test value of 1.385 with an associated significance level of0.0719 that 
indicates a significant effect of the safety campaign. While Operation Lifesaver had an overall 
positive effect on drivers' behavior in reducing the degree to which drivers exceeded the speed limit 
in approaching and crossing railroad tracks at sites with no obvious history of accidents, drivers 
tended to reduce the degree of looking and paying attention to the possibility of a train. One 
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Table 7. Percent of drivers looking at accident site crossings. 
Site.No. % Before Camoai<m % After Camoai1m 
1 46.27 40.54 
2 14.72 22.27 
3 12.83 7.98 
4 42.57 45.56 
5 46.53 35.90 
6 22.90 10.00 
7 27.72 14.15 
8 30.35 46.94 
9 35.62 37.66 
10 45.95 61.75 
11 6.45 12.12 
13 44.44 83.33 
19 46.15 100.00 
Averrure 14.46 28.49 
T bl 8 P ercento a e . f dri "d 1 kin vers at nonacc1 ent sites oo 1g at crossmg. 
Site No. % Before Camoai1m % After Campaign 
14 49.42 31.41 
15 57.26 42.86 
16 42.27 35.14 
17 49.53 30.43 
18 39.68 30.85 
20 8.84 18.85 
21 11.76 16.90 
22 11.63 28.57 
23 14.17 21.05 
Averrui:e 19.65 8.30 
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interpretation is that when a crossing does not have a reputation of being dangerous, drivers are 
content to make some kind of adjustment in their behavior as a result of the urging of the safety 
campaign rather than to make multiple positive responses. 
Vehicle Braking at Crossings 
Data were recorded on the percent of vehicles braking prior to entering the crossing. Prior 
to collecting the data, observers reasoned that even if drivers did not significantly alter their speeds 
approaching the crossing or actually crossing the tracks or increase their rate of looking and paying 
attention while crossing the tracks, increasing the frequency of applying brakes would indicate an 
increase in being prepared to stop if necessary. This was thought to be an important potential 
measure of change in drivers' behavior. However, field data collection showed that this measure is 
greatly affected by factors not related to the safety campaign, such as perceived roughness of the 
crossing, closeness to an intersection, and a signal ahead changing to red. 
Braking at Accident Sites 
Table 9 lists the observed percent of drivers braking when approaching crossings at which 
an accident had occurred in the previous five years. There was a very slight overall average 
increase in braking, which produced at-test value of 0.0108 with an associated level of significance 
of 0.46. This is an insignificant change, suggesting that for these sites Operation Lifesaver had no 
reliable effect on braking. 
Braking at Nonaccident Sites 
Table 10 contains the percent of drivers observed to be braking at crossing sites that had no 
accidents in the previous five years. The large average increase in the observed rate of braking at 
these sites produced at-test value of 3.097 with an associated level of significance of 0.0074. This 
is highly significant and suggests that Operation Lifesaver had a substantial impact on braking at the 
nonaccident sites. These sites were mostly in street and highway environments with few 
intersection or traffic restrictions that would cause a driver to be prepared to stop independent of the 
22 
T l 9 P abe . ercento fct. braki h hin •ct nvers ng w en aooroac ig acc1 ent sites. 
Site No. % Before Campailm % After Campaim 
1 71.64 83.33 
2 46.33 58.28 
3 47.12 66.10 
4 59.14 67.13 
5 54.59 52.76 
6 6.25 5.32 
7 16.73 6.93 
8 39.39 48.01 
9 35.33 35.69 
10 66.99 67.79 
11 6.45 18.46 
13 100.00 92.31 
19 100.00 53.85 
Average 49.99 50.46 
T bl 10 P ercento a e fct. brakin h hi •ct nvers 1g w en aooroac ng nonacc1 ent sites. 
Site No. % Before CampaiJ!:n % After Campaign 
14 29.32 32.13 
15 51.76 45.00 
16 56.97 57.07 
17 59.05 75.00 
18 64.35 74.07 
20 16.33 25.88 
21 27.94 49.30 
22 27.91 44.44 
23 36.30 58.82 
Ave=e 41.1 51.4 
23 
crossing. This may explain why such a dramatic difference in response resulted for the nonaccident 
sites compared to the accident sites. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
On the basis of the fmdings and the analysis presented, the following conclusions are 
suggested. 
• Overall the Operation Lifesaver safety campaign conducted in the Mason City area 
nominally beginning in April 1991 did have an effect on drivers' behavior at railroad-
highway grade crossings immediately following the safety campaign. 
• The impact of Operation Lifesaver was most significant at crossings with low approach 
speed limits and high-volume vehicular traffic in reducing speeds as a measure of the 
driver's increased caution. Since these same crossings were also closest to the "center" 
of the campaign, this conclusion may also be interpreted that increased exposure to the 
message increases drivers' caution. 
Drivers appear to respond to Operation Lifesaver with more and stronger positive 
behavioral changes at crossings with a history of accidents. This suggests that safety 
campaigns need to stress the potential for collision at crossings where trains are not 
frequently seen and are otherwise considered "safe" by drivers. 
• Drivers did not alter their behavior for braking and looking in the same pattern as they 
did in making speed adjustments, leading to the conclusion that drivers make tradeoffs 
in how they will respond to publicity campaigns designed to improve the safety of their 
driving at railroad crossings on ui.e basis of what tliey perceive to be a good selective 
response. 
One concern with the data presented in this report supporting these conclusions is the 
degree to which the observed changes in the behavior of drivers are stable over time. One method 
to assess the impact of the safety campaign is to conduct a followup study at these sites to see 
whether these effects of Operation Lifesaver remain after some time or whether they fade away. 
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